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Abstract—Industry reliability rules increasingly require utili-
ties to study and mitigate cascading failure risk in their system.
Motivated by this, this paper describes how cascading failure
risk, in terms of expected blackout size, varies with power system
load level and pre-contingency dispatch. We used Monte Carlo
sampling of random branch outages to generate contingencies,
and a model of cascading failure to estimate blackout sizes.
The risk associated with different blackout sizes was separately
estimated in order to separate small, medium, and large blackout
risk. Results from N − 1 secure models of the IEEE RTS
case and a 2383 bus case indicate that blackout risk does not
always increase with load level monotonically, particularly for
large blackout risk. The results also show that risk is highly
dependent on the method used for generator dispatch. Minimum
cost methods of dispatch can result in larger long distance power
transfers, which can increase cascading failure risk.
Index Terms—Cascading failure risk, Monte Carlo simulation,
security-constrained optimal power flow
I. INTRODUCTION
Cascading failure in power systems refers to a sequence
of interdependent outages that is initiated by one or more
disturbances. Timely operator intervention can often prevent
a cascade from resulting in a large blackout; however, large
cascades occasionally occur and lead to major blackouts, such
as Aug. 2003 [1] or Sept. 2011 [2]. Although large blackouts
are low-probability events, they can have catastrophic social
and economic impacts. For this reason cascading failure (CF,
hereafter) risk assessment is increasingly required by reliabil-
ity regulations (e.g., from NERC [3]) and is a focus of IEEE
Power and Energy Society activities [4]. State-of-the-art CF
risk assessment methodologies are documented in [4].
In this paper, we used Monte Carlo simulation to estimate
CF risk. Monte Carlo methods are widely used for power
system reliability evaluation [5]. However, their application
to the problem of estimating CF risk is, on the other hand,
much less established in the literature. Standard reliability
models typically only calculate the immediate consequence
of a sampled outage (such as the direct load shedding that
results from a generator outage). Estimating the additional risk
posed by the potential for cascading blackouts is more difficult
for several reasons. Firstly, the simulation of CF remains a
difficult problem, for which little validation data exist, and
more research is needed [4]. Secondly, even if a CF can be
simulated, the size (in terms of MW of load lost) of a CF
can be at any scale, which gives rise to the well documented
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power-law in blackout sizes [6], [7]. Thirdly, the size of the
search space of all possible n−k contingencies, where n is the
number of components that might fail and k is the number that
did fail, is enormous and grows exponentially with n and k.
Finally, the combinations of outages (and operator errors) that
typically trigger CF are usually very low probability and very
high impact, further increasing the required computational
effort.
A few papers have used Monte Carlo sampling for CF risk
estimation [8]–[11], and some used sampling techniques to
reduce the computational cost of risk estimation. The authors
in [8] utilized Monte Carlo simulation and then Importance
Sampling to reduce the computational burden. Ref. [9] used
correlated sampling in a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate
the stress level in the power system. The authors in [10]
showed that importance sampling together with variance re-
duction technique can be used to the increase computational
efficiency of CF risk estimation by a factor of 2-4. In [11], the
Splitting method was used to produce more substantial speed
improvements for a system with both continuous and discrete
uncertainty. Non-sampling approaches, such as branching pro-
cess models [12], [13] provide efficient estimates of risk, but
abstract away some details, such as the ability to identify
which transmission lines contribute to risk estimates. The
authors in [14] and [15] found a phase transition in CF risk
when load level changes.
In this paper, we are interested to study the impacts of
pre-contingency generator dispatch and load level on CF risk.
Here, we use the expected value of blackout sizes resulting
from random contingencies as our metric of risk. The rest
of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the Monte Carlo simulation method. Section III describes the
formulation and assumptions for the pre-contingency system.
Section IV discusses the simulation and results. Section V ex-
plains limitations of the Monte Carlo approach and motivation
for future research. Section VI provides our conclusions from
this study.
II. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
In this paper, we estimate CF risk using Monte Carlo (MC)
simulation. In each MC iteration, we randomly choose a set of
one or more transmission line or transformer (branch) outages
randomly, based on the failure rate of each component. Ideally,
one would select line outages using a joint probability distri-
bution function for line outages, accounting for correlations
among the outage probabilities. Since correlation data are
not generally available and correctly modeling correlated line
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2outages requires some care, we assume that line outages are
independent here. Accounting for correlations in line outage
probabilities remains for future work.
Given this assumption, the probability of two (or more)
simultaneous outages is the product of each line-failure prob-
ability. We use the failure rate of transmission lines (λ,
outages/year), and assume that each failure lasts for 1 hour on
average. Then, the probability of a line failure at each iteration
is computed by pf,i = λi/8760 for all lines, where 8760 is the
number of hours in a year.
Each random draw in the simulation produces a set of
outaged lines with a minimum size of zero. If the size of
the outage is 2 or larger (since the system is known to be
initially n − 1 secure), this contingency is applied to our
cascading failure simulator (CFS), which is explained in [16]
in detail. Following the standard MC approach, we use the
average (expected) blackout size in MW of load shedding as
our measure of risk. The expected value (average) is found by
summing over all event sizes and dividing by the number of
MC iterations (including events with zero blackout size and
zero branch outages).
In finding cascading failure risk, it is useful to separately
consider risk from events of different sizes. To do so, we add
blackout sizes within a certain size range in the numerator
and divide by the number of MC iterations, to find the risk
associated with blackouts in different size ranges.
III. PRE-CONTINGENCY DISPATCH
For the initial results in this paper, we computed the pre-
contingency power flow state for each load level using a
Security-Constrained DC Optimal Power Flow (SCDCOPF).
As a result, each pre-contingency network is n− 1 secure for
any single line outage. Although the DC Optimal Power Flow
(DCOPF) is a relatively simple linear programming problem,
a full SCDCOPF including all line outages as contingencies
can become computationally expensive, especially for larger
systems, because of extensive number of contingencies. To
reduce the computational effort, we solve a decomposed SCD-
COPF based on the method proposed in [17]. The decomposed
SCDCOPF is described as follows.
Initially, DCOPF is solved to find minimal generation cost
dispatch constrained by power flow equations and line flow
limits, with the following formulation:
min
Pg,Pd
cTg Pg − cTdPd (1)
s.t. Pr¯ = Brrθr¯ (2)
|G|∑
i=1
Pg,i =
|D|∑
j=1
Pd,j (3)
F = x−1b Aθr¯ (4)
−Fmax ≤ F ≤ Fmax (5)
0 ≤ Pg ≤ Pg,max (6)
0 ≤ Pd ≤ Pd0 (7)
where Pg and Pd denote vectors of real power generation
and load in the network, and G and D are sets of buses
with generators and loads respectively. cg and cd are vectors
of generator marginal costs and the cost of load shedding
at each bus, respectively (both in $/MWh). Pr¯, Brr and
θr¯ are respectively the vector of real power injections, bus
susceptance matrix, and the vector of bus voltage angles for all
buses except the reference bus. F denotes the line power flow
vector. xb is a matrix with each diagonal entry representing
the susceptance of each line, and zero non-diagonal entries.
A is the node-branch incidence matrix, where the number of
rows and columns are equal to the number of branches and
buses respectively.
Constraints (2) and (3) enforce the DC power flow con-
straints, and constraint (4) calculates flows from bus voltage
angles. Constraints (5), (6) and (7) restrict line flows, real
power generation and load to be between their upper and lower
bounds. Constraint (7), together with the second term in (1),
enables the possibility of load shedding, which ensures that
the problem is always feasible. In order to ensure that load
shedding does not occur unless absolutely necessary, we set
the entries of cd to have large positive values, which are all
greater than cg . In this paper, we assume equal values of cd
for all loads.
In order to make each case n−1 secure, we add contingency
constraints. Here, we use the Line Outage Distribution Factors
(LODF) matrix to find post-contingency line flows after each
line outage [18], which is an m × m matrix, where m
represents the number of branches. Assuming line j is tripped
in the network, each entry hij of the LODF matrix gives the
relative change in flow on line i due to the outage of line
j. Therefore, each post-contingency flow constraint has the
following form:
− F ′i,max ≤ fi + hijfj ≤ F
′
i,min (8)
where F
′
i,max denotes the short term rating of line i. fi and
fj denote the pre-contingency power flows on lines i and
j respectively. In order to solve a full SCDCOPF, one can
add as many as m(m − 1) contingency constraints to the
problem. However, explicitly adding these constraints makes
problem prohibitively computational expensive, especially for
large m. To reduce the computational cost, we implement
a decomposed SCOPF, based on [17], in which contingency
constraints are incrementally added to the problem until the
solution is n − 1 secure. The flowchart of one cycle of this
algorithm is shown in Fig. 1. Typically, only 2 or 3 repetitions
are needed to find an n− 1 secure solution.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
A. Test Networks
We used two test cases to examine how cascading failure
risk changes with system load level. First, the 73-bus RTS-96,
which has 120 branches and 8550 MW of total load [19]. The
pre-contingency DC branch power flows have a mean of 113.8
MW, median of 109 MW, and maximum of 396.1 MW.
The second test system is a model of the 2004 winter peak
Polish power system that is available with MATPOWER [20].
This test system has 2896 branches (transmission lines and
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Figure 1. One cycle of the decomposed SCDCOPF (based on [17])
transformers), 2383 buses, and 24.6 GW of total load. The pre-
contingency DC branch power flows have a mean of 34 MW,
median of 18.7 MW, and maximum of 882.4 MW. For the
Polish case, some of the transmission lines were overloaded
in the original system, so we increased line flow limits to be
the larger of the current limit and 1.05 times the maximum
post-contingency line flows in normal working condition for
each line, after increasing all loads by 10%. This ensures that
line limits are high enough to serve all loads without load
shedding after increasing the base case demand by 10%.
Pre-contingency test cases were prepared for both systems
using the SCDCOPF method from Sec. III, for a range of load
levels from 50% to 119%. 119% was the highest load factor for
which SCDCOPF could find a solution without load shedding
in the RTS-96 case. For the Polish system, load could increase
up to 110% without load shedding. However, we extended our
study up to 115% for comparison, which caused less than 1%
load shedding in the SCDCOPF solution for cases above 110%
load level. Finally, Monte Carlo simulation was performed for
both test networks, for each load level.
B. RTS-96 Results
Fig. 2 shows cascading failure risk, in terms of the expected
value of blackout sizes, for two pre-contingency dispatch
conditions for the RTS case. Panel (a) shows the results
after using SCDCOPF at each load level. Each point on the
graph shows the rolling average of risk across 3 consecutive
integer percentage load levels (i.e., the datum at 90% load
is the average risk for 89%, 90%, and 91%). As previously
mentioned, the risk associated with different blackout sizes
are separately presented. It is interesting to note that small
blackout risk is relatively uniform across all load levels, with
a peak at around 80% load level, whereas large blackout risk
is largest at about 70% load level, and decreases significantly
as the load level increases. Fig. 2 panel (b) shows CF risk
with a proportional dispatch method. To obtain these dispatch
cases, we took the 119% load level case from SCDCOPF, and
uniformly decreased the loads and generators to each smaller
load level. Interestingly, this dispatch approach reduces risk
substantially. Furthermore, what risk remains is purely due
to small blackouts (BO sizes < 5%). The pre-contingency
dispatch in this case is obviously more expensive that that
from the SCDCOPF, which suggests that there is an important
tradeoff between generation dispatch costs and CF risk.
In order to understand the reason behind this difference, we
looked at the power flows on five critical lines that connect the
three areas in the RTS-96 system. An outage on these lines
can cause the system to separate into islands. If this occurs and
there is not enough generation and time to allow generators
to ramp up or down after the network separates into islands, a
large amount of load shedding may occur. The line flow results
in Table I show that the flows are generally much higher at
the 50% and 75% load levels of the SCDCOPF dispatch than
at the 119% level. On the other hand, for the proportional
dispatch case, the power flows change more uniformly as load
changes. These results suggest that the SCDCOPF algorithm is
using more long-distance transmission at moderate load levels,
whereas at higher load levels important transmission corridors
are not loaded as close to their capacity.
C. Polish System Results
The same MC sampling approach was implemented on the
Polish grid, as explained in Section IV-A. Here, we only use
SCDCOPF for the pre-contingency dispatch. Fig. 3 shows CF
risk for all blackout sizes (top), and for only large blackouts
(bottom). This figure shows that there is a high risk associated
with small blackouts (BO sizes < 10%), which increases
uniformly with load level. This result is largely due to the fact
that the Polish test case has numerous loads on radial lines,
the failure of which can cause load shedding in the down-
stream system. Although larger blackouts are less likely, their
outcomes can be catastrophic. Therefore, in this paper, we are
mostly concerned with large blackouts from cascading failure.
Fig. 3 (bottom) shows CF risk associated with blackout sizes
greater than 10% separately for each 10% interval. We see that
the pattern of these blackouts no longer changes uniformly
with load level. It is also worth noting that CF risk decreases
for load percentages higher than 110% (the same cases for
which some load shedding, less than 1%, occurs during the
pre-contingency dispatch).
V. LIMITATIONS OF THE MONTE CARLO APPROACH AND
FUTURE WORK
The expected value of a random variable (blackout size in
our study) can be found if we know the probability distribution
function of that random variable. Given our assumption that
the results of a given contingency are deterministic, if we can
find all branch combinations that cause a blackout, then CF
risk is:
R(x) =
∑
c∈C
Pr(c)S(c, x) (9)
4Load percent
R
is
k 
(E
xp
ec
ted
 B
O 
siz
e, 
kW
)
 
 
(a)
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100105110115
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5 BO<5%
5%<BO<10%
10%<BO<15%
15%<BO<20%
BO>20%
Load percent
R
is
k 
(E
xp
ec
ted
 B
O 
siz
e, 
kW
)
 
 
(b)
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100105110115
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5 BO<5%
5%<BO<10%
10%<BO<15%
15%<BO<20%
BO>20%
Figure 2. CF risk (expected blackout size) for two pre-contingency dispatch conditions: (a) SCDCOPF , and (b) Proportional
Table I
BRANCH FLOW MAGNITUDE IN FIVE CRITICAL LINES CONNECTING THE THREE AREAS IN RTS-96 WITH DIFFERENT LOAD LEVELS AND
PRE-CONTINGENCY DISPATCH
Branch flow magnitude (MW)
SCDCOPF dispatch Proportional dispatch
From (bus no.) To (bus no.) Load level: 50% Load level: 75% Load level: 119% Load level: 50% Load level: 75% Load level: 119%
107 203 23.88 44.38 8.57 3.60 5.40 8.57
113 215 86.32 122.46 50.38 21.17 31.75 50.38
123 217 21.08 31.76 2.67 1.12 1.68 2.67
325 121 156.27 143.58 17.98 7.55 11.33 17.98
318 223 181.27 124.58 31.48 13.23 19.84 31.48
where x is the initial system state, c is a contingency, and C
is the set of all possible contingencies. Pr(c) and S(c, x) are,
respectively, the probability and the blackout size associated
with each contingency c. In this paper, we computed this index
with Monte Carlo simulation, which required 30 hours of
computer time on a high performance platform [21], for each
load level. However, this amount of Monte Carlo simulation
generated primarily n − 2 and a small number of n − 3
contingencies. This is due the fact that higher order outages
are very low probability. However, multiple contingencies do
occur, and sometimes lead to large cascading failures, adding
to the importance of understanding risk from these rare events.
Finding even a small fraction of these rare, but dangerous
contingencies is a challenging task. Ref. [16] used Random
Chemistry algorithm to identify a large collection of n − k
contingencies that lead to cascading failure, but did not extend
the method to actually estimate CF risk. Implementing this
extension is a topic for future research.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study how cascading failure risk, measured
using the expected blackout size from Monte Carlo simulation,
varies with power system load level and pre-contingency
dispatch. We used Monte Carlo sampling of random branch
outages to generate potential contingencies, and a cascading
failure simulator to evaluate the blackout sizes that result. In
order to understand the relative risk from different blackout
sizes, we separately measured risk associated with small,
medium, and large blackouts. The results indicate that, con-
trary to what one might expect, risk does not necessarily
increase with load level monotonically. This is particularly
true for larger blackouts (>5% of load). The results also
show that the method used for pre-contingency generator
dispatch can play an important role in how risk changes
with load level. In one of our test systems, large blackout
risk actually decreases with load, after a threshold, when a
security constrained optimal power flow is used, whereas a
more distributed method of dispatch resulted in a risk profile
that was both lower overall, and that increased monotonically
with load. While proportional dispatch resulted in lower risk, it
was also more expensive. This suggests that there is a tradeoff
between blackout risk and generator dispatch costs.
Although Monte Carlo simulation is useful in cascading
failure risk estimation, because of the low probability, high
impact nature of cascading failure, the MC approach requires
enormous computational resources to obtain sufficiently low-
variance risk estimates. Despite their low probability, multiple-
contingencies can trigger catastrophic blackouts, and need to
be studied carefully. Computing the risk of cascading failure
efficiently is the topic of future research.
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